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36 Abstract 
37 Regulation of food systems exists to ensure safety and enhance consumer confidence 
38 in the food which they purchase and consume. However, some regulatory systems fail 
39 to instil public confidence. In China for example, trust in the domestic food system is 
40 low  as a consequence of multiple high-profile food scandals, many of which linked to 
41 food fraud. Fraud occurs when food is intentionally adulterated for economic gain and 
42 may, but not always, pose a risk to the safety of food. Food authenticity and quality 
43 may also be compromised. The focus of this research relates to how Chinese 
44 consumers perceive food fraud and make choices in the absence of trust in regulatory 
45 systems. Seven focus groups with middle class Chinese participants in tier 1 and 2 
46 cities (Beijing, Guangzhou and Chengdu) were conducted to explore attitudes of and 
47 perception towards food fraud. Infant milk formula, olive oil and Scotch whisky were 
48 used as prompts for attitudinal and perceptual elicitation. The findings indicated that 
49 Chinese consumers consider food fraud to represent a food hazard that poses a threat 
50 to the authenticity, quality and reliability of food and increased the risk of purchasing 
51 and consuming of unsafe food. Consumers were found to rely on informal kinship 
52 networks as trusted sources of information regarding food products’ authenticity and 
53 safety. Behavioural responses included a range of risk relieving strategies to support 
54 food purchasing judgements, in the perceived absence of regulatory protection, that 
55 included: pre-purchase and consumption information seeking; the use of product 
56 attributes as authenticity cues; carefully selected acquisition sources; as well as a 
57 range of domestically-situated food practices. The strategic implications for food 
58 companies and policy are discussed.
59
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62 1 INTRODUCTION 
63 Regulation of the food supply chain and food business operations are intended to 
64 protect public health by ensuring food to be safe for human consumption, and that 
65 products are traceable, appropriately labelled, and can be withdrawn or recalled if 
66 quality and/or safety is compromised (see. E.g.  EC Regulation 178/2002). Such 
67 regulatory frameworks underpin consumer confidence and trust in the foods they 
68 purchase and consume (Garcia Martinez et al., 2013). In environments where such 
69 regulations are either developing and/or a population does not fully trust or have 
70 confidence in the safety and integrity of their food supply, the question of how 
71 consumers make judgements about food safety and integrity arises. This paper 
72 addresses this question through an analysis of Chinese consumers’ attitudes towards, 
73 and perceptions of, food fraud and authenticity and considers their behavioural 
74 responses to limited trust in the domestic food system.
75
76 Chinese food production is associated with various characteristics that make it a 
77 suitable focus for this study. First, China’s ‘industrialisation’ stage of economic growth 
78 and population expansion (expected to reach 1.3 billion by 2050; (Worldbank, 2017)), 
79 is placing significant demands on its agricultural system and food security (Jin and 
80 Jiang, 2002). To meet this increased demand, the domestic food chain has experienced 
81 rapid and often unregulated growth (Eves and Cheng, 2007, Ortega et al., 2011). 
82 Chinese food policy has historically prioritised the provision of adequate quantities of 
83 affordable food to meet rising domestic demand, often to the detriment of the 
84 environment and public health (Zhang et al., 2016, Ghose, 2014, Eves and Cheng, 
85 2007). For example, at the farm level, pressures to increase yields have resulted in the 
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86 over reliance on chemicals in production (Ortega et al., 2011, Ma et al., 2014). The 
87 consequences have been safety problems relating to the sale of vegetables tainted with 
88 hormones, pesticides and antibiotics. These are used to accelerate growth and improve 
89 appearance, at the same time, exceeding regulated limits and posing a potential risk to 
90 public health (Foster, 2011). 
91
92 Second, the food landscape is characterised by a preponderance of small food producers 
93 and manufacturers, whose size and flexibility enables them to elude inspection, cease 
94 trading to avoid punishments and/or re-emerge under a different trading name if they 
95 are associated with food quality and safety problems (Ortega et al., 2011). The scale 
96 and operational flexibility of these businesses poses significant regulatory challenges. 
97
98 Third, regulation of the Chinese domestic food system was only relatively recently 
99 formalised (Tang et al., 2015, Jia and Jukes, 2013). The Chinese Food Safety Law 
100 (2009) represented the first legislative effort to regulate from production through to 
101 consumption (Pei et al., 2011, Zhang and Xue, 2016). This law created a state-level 
102 food safety commission to oversee implementation of the law. The law contained 104 
103 articles outlining key provisions to address the supervision, monitoring and 
104 enforcement of food safety across China by identifying directives for product recall, 
105 traceability, licencing and standards development (Petry and Wu, 2009), and was 
106 arguably a response to the 2008 melamine in formula milk incident. The revised Food 
107 Safety Law (2015) addressed fragmented and unclear institutional responsibilities (Xue 
108 and Zhang, 2013), weak enforcement and inadequate penalties for those contravening 
109 the law (Jia and Jukes, 2013). The Law gave the authorities greater levels of power to 
110 prosecute violations and impose stricter penalties. Although it has been argued that 
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111 China’s current food safety regulations are one of the most stringent globally (Sim, 
112 2016, Zhang et al., 2016), it will take time for the impacts of the 2015 revisions to be 
113 felt. Concerns remain regarding the capacity of the revised legislation to regulate large 
114 numbers of small supply chain actors (Zhang et al., 2016). Challenges can be identified 
115 around limited third party quality certification (Zhang et al., 2015), and lack of data and 
116 technology to support the identification of existing and emerging food safety risks, 
117 including food fraud (Tang et al., 2015). 
118
119 Fourth, despite substantial improvements to the governance of the domestic food 
120 supply chain, communication of regulatory reforms to consumers, transparency and 
121 availability of information regarding food quality and safety measures focused on 
122 consumer protection has been inadequate (Zhang et al., 2016). This criticism has also 
123 been levelled at previous (2009) legislative efforts (Calvin et al., 2006, Liu et al., 2014). 
124 The magnitude of high-profile food scandals, including the 2008 melamine issue (Pei 
125 et al., 2011), the 2011 ‘gutter oil’ scandals, and persistent fraudulent activity reported 
126 across the food system (O'Brien, 2017, China Food and Drink Administration, 2017), 
127 coupled with communication deficiencies, have had profound impacts on consumer 
128 trust. Chinese consumer confidence in the domestic food system is low (Mol, 2014) 
129 and consequently, food safety (including authenticity) has consistently ranked as 
130 Chinese consumer’s top safety concern (Wu et al., 2013, Lam et al., 2013).
131
132 Finally, from an industry perspective, following liberalisation, in recent decades 
133 China has become the “world factory” for both genuine and fake brands (Liu et al., 
134 2015). Chinese consumers are exposed to a vast variety of domestically and 
135 internationally produced products, some of which are counterfeited, or mimicked 
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136 (ibid). At the same time, China represents significant market development 
137 opportunities for food and drink companies. For example, China is Europe’s second 
138 largest export market (after the USA). In 2016, agri-food exports accounted for 8.7% 
139 of all European products exported to China, an increase of 23.7% on the decade 
140 between 2006-2016, with a value of €11, 385 billion (European Commission 
141 Directorate General for Trade, 2017). China’s growing middle-class has significant 
142 purchasing potential, and demand for high quality and luxury foods are increasing, 
143 representing significant market potential for high quality European food exports 
144 (Lomas, 2017, Eves and Cheng, 2007). Therefore, understanding how Chinese 
145 consumers make food purchasing decisions could help European companies to 
146 differentiate their products and support consumers’ judgements about food quality, 
147 reliability and safety. 
148
149 Food authenticity is concerned with ensuring that food offered for sale or sold is of 
150 the “nature, substance and quality expected by the purchaser” (Section 14 Food Safety 
151 Act 1990). It provides a conceptual lens through which questions surrounding food 
152 fraud and safety can be explored and can allow consumers to objectively assess 
153 claims made by product manufacturers. There are two central perspectives on 
154 authenticity; i) objectivist and; ii) constructivist, both of which contribute to the 
155 identification of authentic products and help to develop and maintain consumer trust 
156 (Kendall et al., 2018, Carsana and Jolibert, 2018). Objectivist perspectives consider 
157 authenticity as a quality that can be measured by experts e.g. through verification 
158 using analytical methods to establish if a product’s ingredients and stated origin are 
159 compliant with standards. In contrast, constructivist perspectives regard authenticity 
160 to be a projection of an individual’s belief and expectations about a product (Carsana 
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161 and Jolibert, 2018). This would be supported by the cues that companies use to 
162 enhance their consumers’ confidence in the authenticity of their brands and products. 
163 Objective measures of authenticity are inherently difficult for consumers to verify (i.e. 
164 they are unable to easily perform the analytical tests required to establish if the 
165 composition of a product meets with the ingredients listed). Therefore, when making 
166 food purchase and consumption decisions, consumers more commonly rely upon 
167 constructivist cues provided by manufacturers as heuristics denoting a product’s 
168 authenticity (Grayson and Martinec, 2004, Barnett et al., 2016, McCarthy and 
169 Henson, 2005, Carsana and Jolibert, 2018). Some cues may provide added (objective) 
170 confidence although these are often difficult to verify through analytical methodology 
171 making them potentially vulnerable to fraud. For example, certification indicating 
172 compliance with standard schemes, such as, geographical area of production such as 
173 the European “Protected Geographical Indication” (PGI) or symbolic attributes of a 
174 product conveyed through the marketing and branding.. Tangible (constructivist) cues 
175 such as tamper proof seals, QR codes, holograms, or customer care line information 
176 are an additional reassurance specifically designed to help consumers assess the 
177 integrity of a product at the point of purchase and consumption and act as a key 
178 deterrent to fraudsters. Whilst these may be subject to fraudulent practice, 
179 manufacturers can take measures to ensure that cues are difficult to replicate, 
180 providing the consumer with the most robust indication of a product’s reliability and 
181 authenticity at the point of purchase (Kendall et al., 2018). Consumers are required to 
182 assimilate information provided by the objective, constructivists and integrity cues to 
183 help them make assessments regarding a products authenticity.
184 Conversely, an inauthentic product is created via the act of fraud, which can be 
185 defined as ‘the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or 
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186 misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or packaging; or false or misleading 
187 statements made about a product for economic gain’ (Spink and Moyer, 2011). Food 
188 may be adulterated in many ways. Table 1 presents common types of food fraud and 
189 where possible, provides illustrative examples from cases detected in the Chinese 
190 food supply chain.
191
192 INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
193
194 Food fraud involves intentional and deliberate acts committed for economic gain 
195 (Spink and Moyer, 2011). The undisclosed and unknown nature of possible 
196 adulterants means that food fraud may, but does not always, pose significant risks to 
197 food safety (ibid). For example, the “horsemeat scandal” involved the intentional 
198 mislabelling of horse meat as beef, sold across Europe in 2013. Whilst this incident 
199 did not carry a significant public health risk, it challenged consumer’s trust in the beef 
200 food chain, together with the integrity of the European food system as a whole 
201 (Brooks et al., 2017, Barnett et al., 2016).
202
203 Fraudulent practices have been associated with many of China’s recent food scares (see 
204 Table 1), with these typically uncovered through media reporting rather than official 
205 surveillance or government information dissemination. Zhang and Xue (2016) collated 
206 media reports of food fraud across China from 2004-2014 and identified 1553 reports 
207 of intentional food fraud. In 2007 alone, the Xinhua News Agency reported more than 
208 60,000 fake food cases, with over 15,500 tons of substandard food being confiscated, 
209 and 180 food manufacturers identified as producing sub-standard food or using inedible 
210 ingredients in food manufacturing (Veeck et al., 2010). While the overall risk posed to 
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211 society from malevolent activity in the food system may be assessed by experts to be 
212 low, media reporting serves to amplify public concern and compromise consumer trust 
213 (Kasperson et al., 1988). 
214
215 However, Lord et al. (2017) and van Ruth et al. (2017) suggest that food fraud is not 
216 only committed by highly organised crime syndicates that infiltrate food systems 
217 (Elliott, 2014, Europol, 2015) but can also be perpetrated by legitimate actors in the 
218 food chain, who have access to a location where food fraud can be committed and 
219 where criminal opportunities arise to engage in fraudulent practice alongside 
220 legitimate business operations. The regulatory difficulties arising from the scale of the 
221 Chinese food system, and associated challenges linked to inspection and regulation, 
222 has fostered an environment where food fraud has become an acceptable practice, 
223 even within legitimate food companies, as the 2008 melamine in powdered milk 
224 scandal highlighted (Zhang and Xue, 2016). 
225
226 Furthermore, the cost of food fraud is directly born by the consumer and the food 
227 industry (Elliott, 2014). In addition to potential public health risks, consumers who 
228 fall victim to food fraud may suffer financial loss and experience negative emotions. 
229 This undermines consumer trust in the food industry and its governance. From an 
230 industry perspective, food fraud can dramatically devalue the premium status of a 
231 countries’ supply chains and the value of domestic and export products (Spink et al., 
232 2015), as highlighted by the global ban on exported powdered milk products produced 
233 in China in the wake of the melamine scandal (Liu et al., 2014, Wu et al., 2011). 
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234 1.1 Consumer Trust in Chinese Food Chains
235 Consumer trust underpins consumer confidence in the food which they purchase and 
236 consume. In the absence of food risks, consumer trust in the food supply chain is 
237 typically high, and it is assumed that actors in the food system, particularly those 
238 tasked with food-risk management, take an active role in protecting consumers (De 
239 Jonge et al., 2004). However, in China, numerous food safety incidents have 
240 undermined consumer trust in the domestic food system and the structures that govern 
241 it (Zhang et al., 2016, Liu et al., 2014). 
242 The presence of food risks creates uncertainty for the consumer (Zhang et al., 2016). 
243 Food choices are a routine part of everyday life with consumers making multiple food 
244 choice decisions daily. Consumers do not possess the level of knowledge, or capacity 
245 required to assess the associated risks of each food decision. As a consequence, 
246 consumers rely on information and signals provided to them by the food industry and 
247 its regulators (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). If consumer’s trust the integrity of 
248 actors in the food system, it reduces uncertainty for consumers regarding possible 
249 risks of food and reduces the complexity of everyday decision-making (Luhmann, 
250 2000, Van Rijswijk et al., 2008, Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). 
251
252 The complexity of modern food systems means that food based interactions are 
253 typically conducted between strangers mediated by institutions including food 
254 manufacturers, regulators and enforcement services. Trust in organisations, such as 
255 these, is referred to as “institutional trust”, which is built and maintained through 
256 consumer perceptions that first, regulation, enforcement and surveillance systems are 
257 robust,  and second, transparency in regulation and communication with consumers 
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258 regarding the measures taken to protect their interests in relation to food and the 
259 absence of incidents (Zhang et al., 2016, Barnett et al., 2016). “Institutional trust” is 
260 communicated by signals, or heuristics, provided to consumers by manufacturers and 
261 regulators through, for example, quality certifications, packaging and labelling that 
262 support the evaluation of credence characteristics such as fair trade production claims 
263 (Liu et al., 2015, Grayson and Martinec, 2004, El Benni et al., 2018). However, 
264 institutional trust lacks face-to-face validity and is easily challenged or disrupted, 
265 through for example, the occurrence incidents that compromise the integrity of food, 
266 as has repeatedly been the case in China (see Table 1) (Lyon and Porter, 2007, Zhang 
267 et al., 2016). In these situations, consumers tend to revert to informal networks or 
268 alternative food networks to gather information relevant to the reduction of perceived 
269 risks associated with food. Indeed,  there has been a reported increase in the 
270 prominence of alternative food networks in China in recent years (Lyon and Porter, 
271 2007, Zhang et al., 2016, Kendall et al., 2018). To increase institutional trust, the 
272 Chinese government has introduced progressively more stringent regulation and 
273 enforcement activities (via the Food Safety Law 2009 and 2015) to improve domestic 
274 food safety standards and increase harmonisation with  international standards, as 
275 well as to meet growing consumer demand for food safety improvements (Wang et 
276 al., 2009).
277
278 Certification schemes have been introduced to compliment regulatory reforms and  
279 aim to improve food safety, reduce the ecological impact of food production, and 
280 improve consumer trust in food produced in China1. Standards and certifications do 
11 Three primary certification schemes are present in China, ‘Green food’, ‘Hazard free food’ and ‘safe 
food’. The ‘Green Food’ certification was introduced to reduce the ecological impact of farming 
practice. Limits the use of chemicals used in the production process to safe chemical synthetic 
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281 not relate directly to food fraud prevention. Nonetheless, they provide signals by 
282 which the consumer can objectively verify the quality of food and help to establish its 
283 reliability and rebuild trust in the integrity of the domestic food supply chain. 
284 However, very few products available to Chinese consumers are certified, and 
285 multiple labels are used by manufacturers to represent the same certification (Mol, 
286 2014). Moreover, imported food products carry additional certifications, signalling 
287 compliance with production standards in their country/region. For example, European 
288 products carry certifications that signify country of origin and production 
289 specifications (i.e. “Protected Destination of Origin” (PDO) and “Protected 
290 Geographic Indication” (PGI)). The proliferation of certifications included on food 
291 may cause consumer confusion (Scott et al., 2014). Consumers may be uncertain 
292 about the meaning and use of food certifications and safety labelling, and may distrust 
293 the authenticity of product certifications (Calvin et al., 2006), highlighting the 
294 widespread belief amongst Chinese consumers that certifications can be counterfeited 
295 and/or purchased, and therefore are not a reliable guarantee of food quality or safety 
296 (Zhang et al., 2016). In addition, transparency around food systems is not routinized 
297 or institutionalised, and actions taken to improve consumer protection have not been 
298 appropriately communicated to consumers (ibid), further adding to a lack of 
299 institutional trust. 
300 Research conducted to date, exploring the drivers of Chinese consumer trust in the 
301 domestic food system, has primarily focused on understanding consumer attitudes 
302 towards traceability, including willingness-to-pay for food that can be traced through 
substances. ‘Hazard Free Food’ designed to address the Chinese food safety ‘crisis’ and agro chemical 
contamination (Scott, 2014). A wider range of agro-chemicals are allowed than ‘Green Food’ and 
provides a basic set of standards for food that is sold in mainstream food chains. ‘Organic Food’ 
established to meet international market demand and ensure that Chinese food was able to compete 
in this growing international market and a certification that was imported from the west. 
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303 the supply chain and/or that carries product quality certifications, and credence 
304 attributes such as country of origin (see Bai et al. (2013), Zhang et al. (2012), El 
305 Benni et al. (2018), Ortega et al. (2011), Tang et al. (2015), Walley et al. (2014), Wu 
306 et al. (2011), Xu and Wu (2010), Xu et al. (2012), Zhang et al. (2016)). Whilst these 
307 mechanisms help consumers to identify food that is safe, meets quality expectations 
308 and provides an objective basis upon which product claims might be assessed, food 
309 fraud has not been the explicit focus. This research seeks to address this gap by 
310 providing detailed baseline insights into how Chinese consumers perceive food fraud 
311 and the threats that emanate from malevolence in the food chain. In a situation where 
312 the perceived vulnerability to encountering fraud is regarded to be high, trust in the 
313 regulatory authorities to identify fraud and penalties given to those perpetrating fraud 
314 are considered to be low, we explore how consumers deal with information 
315 asymmetry and make food choice judgements, and in so doing, address the following 
316 research questions: 
317 1. What are Chinese consumer’s attitudes towards and perceptions of food fraud?
318 2. What are the behavioural responses discussed by Chinese consumers to mitigate 
319 the perceived risks posed by fraudulent activity in the food chain? And;
320 3. What are the implications for the European and Chinese food industry and 
321 policy makers?
322 Perception research of this nature is of relevance to a range of stakeholders including, 
323 food policymakers, regulators and the food industry. It supports the development of 
324 targeted policies and practical measures that reduce consumers’ level of risk concern 
325 and increase trust in the domestic food supply chain as well as providing insights as to 
326 how these might be most effectively communicated to consumers (Renn, 2004).
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327 2 METHOD
328 To explore how middle-class Chinese consumers’, as the intended target market for 
329 European food products, make decisions about the integrity of food that they 
330 purchase and consume, focus group methodology was employed. Focus groups 
331 capture of data regarding consumers’ decisions and provide an opportunity to 
332 explore the social context in which they are made (Robinson, 1999). As carefully 
333 planned discussions which are conducted in a non-threatening environment 
334 (Krueger, 2014), focus groups are a well-established technique for eliciting attitudes 
335 and perceptions about abstract concepts which are enhanced by group interactions 
336 (Kitzinger, 1994). The methodology has cross-cultural validity, and has been used 
337 in the Chinese cultural context to explore consumer food choices (Veeck et al., 
338 2010) and perceptions of novel food production technologies (Perrea et al., 2015). 
339 2.1 Procedure
340 Discussion guides were developed and refined based upon a review of the literature. 
341 Selected food products from Europe, available on the Chinese market, were used to 
342 focus and facilitate the discussion. Three product categories, i) Scotch whisky, ii) 
343 infant milk formula and iii) olive oil, were selected. The product categories were 
344 chosen on the basis of the contrasting perspectives that they offered to explore 
345 perceptions of food fraud and adulteration based upon: the products’ food safety 
346 and adulteration histories in the EU and China; traceability-related labelling cues 
347 such as protected designation of origin (PDO) and country of origin references; 
348 product usage amongst different consumer groups with different vulnerabilities (i.e. 
349 infants); and use across diverse consumption occasions (Table 2). Product and 
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350 brand choice2 were based upon their availability and familiarity in the Chinese 
351 market, and differences in product origin and packaging. The Scotch whisky 
352 prompts were presented as pictures on laminated cards. Infant milk formula and 
353 olive oil products were shown to discussants.  
354
355 INSERT TABLE TWO HERE
356
357 Owing to the differences in usage profiles and contexts of the product categories, 
358 two discussion protocols were developed. The first incorporated infant milk formula 
359 and olive oil, and the second Scotch whisky and olive oil. The structure and 
360 questions included in the two protocols were identical in order to facilitate 
361 comparative analysis. Following a welcome introduction, the discussion opened 
362 with questions relating to food safety concerns. This led into discussions about food 
363 authenticity and participant awareness of food fraud in relation to the specific 
364 product examples. The discussion then considered attitudes towards traceability, 
365 confidence and trust in food provenance. Communication preferences with regards 
366 to food authenticity were explored and a “wind-down” allowed participants the 
367 opportunity to ask questions and provide comments on the process. The full 
368 discussion guide is available from the authors on request. 
369
370 The protocol was piloted via two focus groups with a convenience sample of 
371 Chinese students studying at the UK authors’ university. Piloting was conducted to 
372 test procedural aspects of the protocol, and ensure questions were relevant to a 
2 Product prompt brand choice are not detailed although information is available from the 
corresponding author on request. 
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373 Chinese sample. The discussion guide was translated into Chinese by the social 
374 research agency, Millward Brown, who provided recruitment and moderation 
375 support. For consistency across groups, the same moderator conducted all groups. A 
376 bilingual member of the project team back-translated the protocol to ensure that 
377 “meaning” was appropriately conveyed in Chinese. Ethical approval for the 
378 research was granted by the lead authors’ university ethics committee in August 
379 2014.
380 2.2 Sample 
381 Seven focus groups were conducted in three Chinese cities in the North, South and 
382 East of China respectively, Beijing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. 42 participants took 
383 part in the study (Table 3). Two groups were held in each location. One group per 
384 protocol was conducted in each city, and an additional pilot group was held in 
385 Beijing, with no protocol amendments made to subsequent group discussions (group 
386 1). Beijing and Guangzhou are first tier cities and represent the most economically 
387 developed regions in China with the most affluent consumers. Chengdu is a second 
388 tier city, and is a capital city at the provincial level and are considered to be 
389 developing. Consumer trends mimic those in the first tier cities. Consistent with 
390 best practice, each focus group contained 6 participants recruited on demographic 
391 characteristics and purchasing habits, specifically gender (males and females), age 
392 (18-45 years), socio-economic status (middle/upper class); who had purchased 
393 infant formula milk, olive oil or Scotch whisky in the last three months; were the 
394 main or joint decision maker for food purchases in their home and had resided in 
395 their respective cities for 3 years or more. 
396
397 INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
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398
399
400 All focus groups were held at the regional offices of the social research agency. To 
401 ensure quality of the data collected, members of the research team were present at 
402 each group. Discussions were simultaneously translated and observed by the 
403 research team via two-way glass. Each focus group lasted approximately two hours, 
404 was digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim in Chinese, and translated into 
405 English for subsequent analysis. All participants were given an incentive payment 
406 for their contribution to the research, in line with typical remuneration for research 
407 participants in China. During discussions, notes were made by members of the 
408 project team on content, group dynamics and recurrent ideas and discussions that 
409 emerged across the groups. These preliminary reflections aided the first stage of the 
410 analysis process and helped to frame the concepts that were used to develop a 
411 systematic coding framework in stage one of the analysis. All data were collected in 
412 January 2015. 
413
414 Data were analysed using analysis package QSR NVivo 11 (NVivo, 2016). Analysis 
415 followed a three-stage process. First, three members of the project team (HK, SK 
416 and MD) independently undertook open coding of the transcripts using an 
417 inductive, grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This process involved 
418 each research reading each of the transcripts and identifying common themes across 
419 the groups for later discussion. Second, researchers (HK, SK and MD) met 
420 (February 2015) to discuss and consolidate the emerging key concepts, 
421 subsequently an initial coding framework developed by the lead researchers (HK 
422 and SK). Refinement of the coding framework involved two members of the 
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423 research team (HK and SK) independently coding transcripts and comparing the 
424 codes against the framework. The final stage involved one researcher (HK) coding 
425 the full data set into the coding framework. The coding framework is available from 
426 the corresponding author upon request.
427 3 FINDINGS
428 The focus groups revealed a broad range of insights relating to how Chinese 
429 consumers responded to the absence of a trusted regulatory environment. 
430 Participants were forthcoming in sharing their views and experiences of fraudulent 
431 practices in the food chain. Five prominent themes emerged from the data that 
432 concerned; 1) food fraud as a perceived risk to the safety of food, 2) barriers to 
433 attainment of authentic and safe food, 3) consequences for the consumer of food 
434 fraud, 4) consumers’ risk-relieving strategies, and 5) situational dependence of the 
435 perceived importance of food fraud. The findings are discussed under these themed 
436 headings and supported by illustrative quotes from participants that are direct 
437 translations from Chinese to English. Quotes are labelled according to the focus 
438 group location, the group number and discussant gender. 
439
440 1) Food fraud; as a perceived risk to the safety of food 
441 Respondents used food fraud as an umbrella term that encompassed concerns 
442 relating to the authenticity, safety, quality and the reliability of food. Herein food 
443 fraud will be defined in line with participant perceptions, as an intentional action 
444 taken to deceive the consumer and compromise the authenticity, safety, quality and 
445 reliability of food. In the absence of fraud, food was considered to be authentic i.e. 
446 was what it claimed to be, safe and of reliable quality. Across all groups, the 
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447 potential risks that fraudulent activity in the food chain posed to the safety of food 
448 was of greatest concern. 
449
450 The safety of food was couched within expressions of anxiety, concern and 
451 resignation, that fraud and the safety implications of this, needed to be “accept[ed] 
452 if you must live here” (Chengdu, G4, Male). Participants gave many examples of 
453 cases of food fraud that had been reported in the media, and recalled incidents in 
454 which they perceived the food that they had purchased or consumed to have been 
455 subjected to fraud. The perceived incidents could be categorised as cases of 
456 misdescription, adulteration or counterfeiting as the following quotes illustrate: 
457
458 “Lots of ingredients are not in the list, but the ingredients which are 
459 not in the list may cause bad effect on the body” (Chengdu, G4, 
460 Male).
461
462 “The news has reported that vegetables have been grown with 
463 pesticides and hormones that are over the limited amount” 
464 (Guangzhou, G6, Female). 
465
466 “I think these are all worries for the food we eat, for the meat, there 
467 is lean pork powder, using the pork to replace the beef, or the meat 
468 that is from ill animals not intended for human consumption” 
469 (Guangzhou, G6, Female).
470
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471 “Many brands are only a little different between the real one [and 
472 fakes], …the difference is one word, Yi Bao, it will be called Yi Hao” 
473 (Guangzhou, G7, Male).
474
475 Embedded with the examples of food fraud were perceived risks to the safety, 
476 quality and reliability of food. Notably, participants were unable to distinguish the 
477 concept of food fraud from food safety. Respondents did not recognise that food 
478 subjected to fraud may, but also may not, pose a risk to the safety of food. Thus, 
479 food fraud was considered a significant risk to the safety of food and the health of 
480 consumers. 
481
482 2) Barriers to the attainment of authentic and safe food 
483 Fraudulent practices in the food chain represented one of three perceived barriers to 
484 the attainment of authentic food precipitated by; 1) the complexity; 2) size of the 
485 Chinese domestic food system and; 3) deficiencies in the regulatory environment 
486 linked to food chain complexity and size. These were considered to provide an 
487 environment conducive to misconduct by external actors (criminals) and 
488 opportunistic internal food system agents, and cited by participants as the primary 
489 reasons for the Chinese domestic food supply chain’s vulnerability to fraud. Figure 
490 1 presents the authors interpretation of how these factor link together. 
491
492 INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
493
494 The highly fragmented structure of the Chinese food industry, characterised by a 
495 proliferation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), was considered to 
496 present significant regulatory challenges to reducing fraudulent practice. Rapid 
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497 growth and development of the food system in recent decades was perceived to 
498 have placed considerable pressures on regulatory systems, and incentivised 
499 fraudsters. Effective regulation and enforcement was believed to be inhibited by the 
500 physical and financial capacity of multiple food regulation agencies to supervise 
501 food production and manufacturing, and enforce compliance with standards.
502
503 “The city in China is developing, there are many things you can’t 
504 catch up with…the department [food regulators] face such a lot of 
505 people, they can’t cover everything, things are changing rapidly in 
506 China.” (Guangzhou, G6, Male).  
507
508 “Maybe the lack of people, they [food regulators and enforcement] 
509 can’t check every market” (Gunagzhou, G6, Female). 
510
511 Greater risk of intentional criminality was believed to occur at smaller food 
512 production and manufacturing sites that eluded regulation. Greater trust in larger 
513 food manufacturers and producers was expressed; brand equity was perceived as 
514 having significant corporate value, and represented a key fraud prevention 
515 mechanism. A cultural explanation for fraudulent practices was the profit driven 
516 focus of the Chinese food industry, which, supported by economic policy, was 
517 considered to prioritise the pursuit of economic gain over consumer interests.
518
519 “Chinese people [industry] have faith about money, they believe profit 
520 is the most important thing” (Beijing, G2, Female).
521
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522 This prioritisation of profits over consumer interests manifested in poor customer 
523 service, and the perceived reluctance of food producers to recall products if 
524 problems relating to authenticity and/or safety were identified. This was considered 
525 to be most pronounced in small-scale manufacturers, who were believed to be 
526 difficult to locate and unresponsive to consumer concerns. Larger retailers were 
527 acknowledged to be more accountable and willing to recompense consumers for 
528 products that did not meet with their quality expectations. 
529
530 ‘‘They [smaller companies] do not think they have much duty. Their 
531 attitude is just if consumer can find, they will return the money. If 
532 consumer cannot find, then nothing happens”. (Chengdu, G4, Female).
533
534 Disparities in regulatory standards, between cities and provinces in China and 
535 between Chinese and international standards were also noted. More stringent 
536 regulation of food producers and manufacturers in higher tier cities were perceived 
537 to exist, as the following participant explains: 
538
539 “If you live in China…in the third-tier cities, it’s terrible, on the food 
540 safety aspect…they just put things to the first-tier city in China… the 
541 development of supervision for the countryside in comparison to the 
542 city is not good, one reason is they have no money” (Guangzhou, G6, 
543 Male). 
544 Discrepancies in food quality and safety (including authenticity) were 
545 identified between foods produced domestically and internationally, with 
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546 respondents regarding food produced internationally, particularly in Europe 
547 to offer greater authenticity, quality and safety assurances. 
548
549 ‘We think the power of foreign country is strong, and the food 
550 is reliable, such as Europe... I think the reality is that food is 
551 more reliable in other countries.’ (Beijing, G2, Female). 
552
553 Additional barriers to authentic food which compounded trust in the regulatory 
554 environment included: perceived lack of punishment of fraud offenders; perceived 
555 corruption linking food producers and regulators, such that “permissions can be 
556 bought” (Chengdu, G4, Male), and a reactive rather than proactive approach to 
557 governance.  
558
559 “A lot of brands are exposed relating to [food] quality problem[s], but 
560 I have never heard that they are punished.” (Chengdu, G4, Male). 
561
562 Despite strict penalties for those implicated in food fraud imposed by the Food 
563 Safety Law 2015, consumers maintained the perception that regulators adopted a 
564 lax approach, with food manufacturers known to be engaged in fraudulent activities 
565 in order to promote economic growth in the sector.
566
567 3) Consequences for the consumer of food fraud
568 The implications of purchasing and consuming inauthentic food included both 
569 direct and indirect impacts, including illness, a loss of “face”, emotional harms and 
570 disempowerment through a lack of personal control in the provisioning of authentic 
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571 and safe food. Consumers attributed food fraud to direct health risks, and cited the 
572 2008 melamine in milk food scandal to illustrate the potential magnitude of the risks 
573 associated with food fraud. It was the perceived risk of harm from food fraud at the 
574 level of the family unit that posed greatest concern to participants. Concerns were 
575 expressed for the unknown, long-term, cumulative health impacts for infants and 
576 children whilst adults were identified as having greater resilience to impurities 
577 within their food. Responsibility for ensuring the integrity and safety of children’s 
578 foods was identified as the sole responsibility of parents, and resulted in greater 
579 involvement in the purchase of goods intended for consumption by infants and 
580 children.
581
582 “The baby cannot distinguish what they have eaten, so their foods 
583 need to be check[ed]. We would rather maltreat ourselves than 
584 maltreat our children.” (Guangzhou, G5, Female).
585
586 Indirect impacts included the loss of “face” (accompanied by embarrassment, 
587 shame, and humiliation) emerged as a sub-theme and was considered a significant 
588 negative consequence of food that had been subjected to fraud. The Chinese cultural 
589 practice of gifting, expensive, well-presented (denoted by high quality packaging) 
590 goods, which signify the esteem of the giver to the recipient, is laden with “cultural 
591 affect”. Product authenticity as denoted by indexical attributes such as price, 
592 packaging and country of origin was therefore important in the observance of 
593 expected social conventions. Increased care was taken by consumers when selecting 
594 products suitable for “gifting” as it was socially unacceptable to give inauthentic 
595 gifts: “we can’t give counterfeits as gifts” (Chengdu, G4, Male). Encountering 
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596 inauthentic food resulted in emotions of anxiety, anger, foolishness, embarrassment, 
597 anxiety and humiliation through being cheated, deceived and/or tricked by food 
598 producers and retailers, a sub-theme which emerged across all groups. The strength 
599 of these emotions and level of acceptance varied according to purchase and/or 
600 consumption situation. For example, the melamine adulterated infant milk formula 
601 in 2008 still provoked feelings of outrage by participants. However, in the case of 
602 Scotch whisky, there were social drinking occasions (i.e. when purchasing from 
603 bars) when participants were “resigned” to the likelihood that they would encounter 
604 “fake” whisky. Underpinning the potentially negative consequences of encountering 
605 food that is inauthentic was the perceived lack and/or loss of consumer control, 
606 which arose from inability to judge the authenticity and safety of food, compounded 
607 by the lack of transparency regarding the measures taken to protect consumer’s 
608 interests in relation to food and the perceived lack of responsibility taken by food 
609 producers. 
610
611 4) Risk relieving strategies
612 Behavioural responses to the dissonance arising from a lack of control surrounding 
613 food authenticity, safety, quality and reliability were manifested in consumers 
614 adopting complementary ‘risk reliving’ pre- and post- consumption strategies 
615 intended to minimise exposure to food risks including those arising from food fraud. 
616 These (see Figure 2), included: 1) information searching; 2) the use of authenticity 
617 cues as heuristics denoting the authenticity; 3) carefully selected acquisition 
618 sources; and 4) a range of domestically situated practices. 
619
620 INSEERT FIGURE 2 HERE
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621 Due to imperfect knowledge about the authenticity of their food, and lack of trust in 
622 the regulatory environment, participants actively sought information prior to the 
623 purchase of food. Trusted information sources included external sources such as 
624 word of mouth from friends and family, and media channels including television, 
625 and social media channels such as “We Chat”. Previous personal experience 
626 provided “internal” information reference points. In the absence of institutional 
627 trust, participants prioritised recommendations from people in their immediate 
628 networks of family and friends (“personalised trust” networks) above other forms of 
629 external information, such as online forums and previously trusted retailers. As one 
630 participant identified, there “must be no cheating between friends” (Beijing, G3, 
631 Female). At the point of purchase participants reported using a range of cues 
632 provided by manufacturers and regulators as heuristics denoting authenticity which 
633 objective, constructed and integrity indicators (see Figure 2) were applied in 
634 combination to support assessments of a product’s authenticity. Despite 
635 manufacturers providing objective cues of authenticity (product certifications, 
636 country of origin labelling, etc.) across the groups, participants reported relying on 
637 traditional attributes including brand, price, and packaging as key product 
638 differentiators, particularly where respondents possessed limited category 
639 knowledge. As the following quotes illustrate, these cues were taken to infer 
640 authenticity which included quality, safety and reliability attributes. 
641
642 “I’ll buy the best one. Because I have the traditional mind, I think the 
643 more expensive thing have its advantage, and for the cheaper one, I’ll 
644 doubt about its quality” (Beijing, G3, Male).
645
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646 “We think the brand is important. Famous brands are safer…We try to 
647 buy better raw materials, or buy great brand or buy the raw material 
648 that has high price. We can feel comfortable by this way…I think we 
649 need to be dependent on ourselves. We need to choose by ourselves. 
650 The product cannot be cheap and have good quality at same time. 
651 Whatever this country does, I can buy better brand though it is 
652 expensive’ (Chengdu, G4; Male). 
653
654 Integrity cues including tamper proof seals, QR codes and barcodes, provided by 
655 manufacturers specifically designed to infer a products integrity, were recognised to 
656 support authenticity assessments. Participants reported checking for broken seals, 
657 signs of tampering, poor craftsmanship, the quality of the printed labels and the 
658 accuracy of labelling information. However, QR codes and barcodes were 
659 considered to require additional time to interpret during shopping and were largely 
660 overlooked. 
661
662 “I care about the body of bottle. Then I care about cap. Some fake wine 
663 [spirits] is too ridiculous. It is very loose when you open it. [The] 
664 Chinese are genius at making counterfeits.” (Chengdu, G4, Female). 
665
666 The acquisition source or place of purchase was important in determining the 
667 authenticity of food products. The reputation of the retailer provided a further 
668 mechanism for participants to overcome their uncertainty and risk perceptions 
669 associated with food fraud. Participants perceived smaller retailers as most likely to 
670 be implicated in fraudulent activity and largely avoided these. To alleviate concerns, 
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671 participants purchased products from “trusted retailers”, which included, large, 
672 well-known retailers, for example premium supermarket chains such as OLE, or 
673 Carrefour, and department stores. Such retailers carried imported product lines and 
674 were acknowledged as “more dependable to choose things from the foreign 
675 countries’ goods shelf” (Beijing, G3, Male). Discussants also reported that imported 
676 goods that had been produced and packaged outside of China, internationally 
677 branded goods produced domestically, and goods made internationally but 
678 packaged in China were avoided. Concerns regarding adulteration by Chinese actors 
679 involved in production and packaging were raised; 
680
681  I am afraid that the imported milk sources from abroad have experienced 
682 second packaging and domestic packaging, which will add something we 
683 don’t know, second pollution.’ (Chengdu, G5, Male). 
684
685 Consumers acknowledged the price premiums associated with the purchase of 
686 (fully) imported products, but were willing to accept this expense in order to assure 
687 the authenticity of products carrying social or health risks. 
688
689 “We can do nothing but to buy things at OLE. We can only buy 
690 something at imported supermarket, whose products are safe although 
691 a little expensive…Although it is more expensive than other 
692 supermarkets, its quality can be assured.” (Chengdu, G5, Female).
693
694 Consumer preference for imported products as the primary assurance against fraud, 
695 combined with the limited availability of imported products in the Chinese market, 
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696 required consumers to look for alternative means to acquire their preferred and 
697 trusted brands. Participants reported two primary mechanisms, first, through travel 
698 to neighbouring states. For example, participants living in Guangzhou reported 
699 travelling to Hong Kong and Macau for infant milk formula. Second, via trusted 
700 kinship networks that extended into foreign countries where infant milk formula 
701 was purchased and shipped back to China. The additional expense of this practice 
702 and the potential unreliability was noted, although accepted, in order to guarantee 
703 authenticity and safety of products, particularly those intended for infants.
704
705 Recognising that certain retailers offered differing levels of product availability and 
706 quality, participants adopted a “profile” approach to procurement. This involved 
707 buying products from a range of different retailers to ensure product authenticity. 
708 The reliance on kinship networks to ensure access to authentic products was further 
709 illustrated when considering an acquisition source. Where possible, participants 
710 reported the desire to develop personal relationships with purveyors, considering 
711 that such relationships would reduce fraud, as the retailers would have a duty of 
712 care to them as consumers and as friends. For example, in the purchase of meat, 
713 consumers reported sourcing whole carcasses of animals (pork, lamb and beef) 
714 directly from farmers, reflecting a growing consumer interest in alternative Chinese 
715 food networks, and willingness to travel outside of the city to purchase from the 
716 producer directly. This practice significantly shortened the supply chain, and 
717 removed anxieties relating to environmental pollution, contamination and 
718 adulteration. 
719
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720 “One of my classmates sells organic vegetables or organic 
721 agricultural products. The eggs she sells are organic, too. All 
722 the animals in there are feed by coarse cereals. I went to her 
723 farms for one time. I totally trust that kind of farms. The food 
724 from there has no additives or many processes. I feel assured of 
725 that natural food.” (Chengdu, G4, Female).
726
727 Participants also discussed measures taken at home (domestically situated practices) 
728 to ensure the authenticity of food. Following the “gutter oil” scandal, consumers 
729 reported trying to avoid eating out at restaurants, showing preference for home-
730 prepared food.
731
732 “I feel nowadays many people have abused to use hormone and 
733 chemical… And [there are] plenty [of] fake products imitate[ing] 
734 qualifying products, so I am trying to only cook and eat at home” 
735 (Chengdu, G4, Male).
736
737 Consumers reported growing their own vegetables to reduce the amount of 
738 chemicals involved in production. Some use of ozone washers to remove microbial 
739 contamination and chemical residues was also mentioned. In the case of fish and 
740 crustaceans, preference for the purchase of live products was expressed so that they 
741 could be kept in fresh water prior to consumption to allow for toxins and impurities 
742 to pass through before preparation and consumption. 
743
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
33
744 “We buy some special powder from Japan to wash vegetables. We 
745 pour some of the powder on the vegetables when we washed it, but 
746 there is still something that we can’t get rid of” (Beijing, G1, 
747 Female). 
748
749 “I have a roof that is on top…a small area, then [I] plant some 
750 lettuce, sweet potato, leaves and the like” (Guangzhou, G6, 
751 Female).
752 4 DISCUSSION
753 The Chinese domestic food supply chain has been beset with incidents that have 
754 undermined its integrity and led to widespread consumer anxiety and reduced trust 
755 regarding the authenticity, safety and quality of food that is available. This research 
756 indicates that despite significant reforms to food safety governance in China 
757 implemented by respective food safety acts (The Food Safety Law 2009 and 2015), 
758 Chinese consumer trust in the domestic food system remains low. High profile food 
759 safety incidents, of which many represent cased of fraud, highlight the pervasive 
760 nature of fraudulent activity within Chinese food chains. Incidents have been shown 
761 to be perpetrated by both criminals that have infiltrated legitimate food chains and 
762 legitimate actors within legitimate food chains, as the 2008 melamine scandal 
763 illustrated and is recognised to be a significant factor in low levels of consumer trust 
764 in the food systems and its governance (Elliott, 2014, Lord et al., 2017, van Ruth et 
765 al., 2017). Post melamine, continued widespread media reporting of food fraud 
766 incidents has amplified societal risks response, and further heightened consumer 
767 concerns regarding the risks that fraud poses to the attainment of safe food 
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768 (Kasperson et al., 1988). Despite this, a limited body of literature has sought to 
769 explore the wider implications of food fraud for Chinese consumers (El Benni et al., 
770 2018).
771
772 Whilst there are accepted differences between the concepts of food fraud, food 
773 safety, food authenticity and food quality (Spink et al., 2015), a significant finding 
774 of this research, is that Chinese consumers do not distinguish between these 
775 concepts, rather, they considered food fraud to be a term, encompassing risks to all 
776 of these and ultimately the attainment of safe food. The potential for unknown 
777 contaminants to be present, and evidence of significant health implications linked to 
778 previous incidents, resulted in Chinese consumers perceiving food fraud to 
779 represent a risk to the general safety of their food. This is consistent with previous 
780 research that found food safety to be the most significant safety concern of Chinese 
781 consumers, which encompassed “counterfeit” and “inferior quality” food as the 
782 issues that the Chinese public were most concerned about(see (Liu et al., 2014). 
783 The lack of trust in the Chinese food system was linked to a variety of factors: first, 
784 the high prevalence of food safety incidents in China and representation of these in 
785 the media, many of which are classified as cases of fraud. Second, the perceived 
786 historical leniency of the Chinese government to regulate the domestic food system 
787 as well as regulatory disparities nationally. Third, the challenges associated with the 
788 regulation of a large, complex and fragmented system. Fourth, the perceived lack of 
789 transparency regarding measures taken to protect consumers’ interest in relation to 
790 food; and finally, the perceived lack of organisational accountability taken when 
791 foods do not meet with consumers’ quality expectations. 
792
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793 The Chinese Food Safety Law enacted in 2009 was the Chinese government’s first 
794 attempts at formalising their response to food safety failings, improving standards 
795 nationally and internationally and rebuilding consumer trust post melamine. Despite 
796 the significant improvements this made, this research identified deep routed 
797 consumer concerns and limited recognition of the measures taken to improve the 
798 safety of the Chinese food system. This indicates the need for more effective 
799 communication of the mechanisms that have been implemented to protect consumer 
800 interests in relation to food and greater levels of transparency around the regulatory 
801 process (i.e. surveillance mechanisms and penalties for non-compliance). 
802
803 Government and industry share the responsibility for improved consumer 
804 communications regarding risk management and mitigation actions and consumers 
805 voiced the need for industry to make more concerted efforts to provide them with 
806 reassurances should products not meet with quality expectations and/or where 
807 necessary, be proactive in recalling products when products have been exposed as 
808 implicated in fraud. Similar consumer calls for transparency and accountability 
809 were found in a study conducted by (Barnett et al., 2016) that explored consumers 
810 in the UK and Republic of Irelands (ROI) response to the 2013 “horsemeat” 
811 incident.
812
813 Consumers recognised the challenges inherently associated with the regulation of a 
814 large and fragmented food chain and identified this to be a key barrier to the 
815 attainment of authentic and safe food. Despite efforts to harmonise standards 
816 nationally and internationally, disparities in the quality of regulation between cities 
817 and provinces were identified (see Tam and Yang (2005). To account for the 
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818 dispersed nature of food supply chains, further improvements were considered 
819 necessary to improve consistency of risk management in lower tier cities with first 
820 tier cities, and improve food regulation and enforcement in these cities, which were 
821 identified as being the most vulnerable to fraud. Research conducted by Kendall et 
822 al. (2018) indicates that consumers in lower tier Chinese cities perceive the greatest 
823 risk to the authenticity and safety of food as a result of fraud, however, they also 
824 found that structural trust was not a significant predictor of attitude and intention to 
825 purchase authenticated food. 
826
827 The range of behavioural response strategies to personally mitigate vulnerability to 
828 encountering inauthentic food in response to the dissonance arising from the lack of 
829 control regarding the authenticity and safety of food, coupled with perceived 
830 regulatory deficiencies, is a key finding of this research. This also provides a 
831 possible explanation as to why structural trust was not identified to be a significant 
832 predictor of attitude and intention to purchase authenticated foods (see Kendall et al. 
833 (2018). Consumers were shown to have developed a range of, pre through to post 
834 purchase and consumption, strategies to mitigate the risks of encountering unsafe 
835 food, which included food that had been subject to fraud. These practices included 
836 extended information searching regarding products and acquisition sources, careful 
837 identification of reputable and trusted retailers, the use of cues provided by 
838 manufacturer to help support the identification of authentic product and a number of 
839 domestically situated practices (see Figure 2). 
840 Consumer preference for imported foods over domestic products were shown 
841 despite the acknowledged price premium. It is recognised that Chinese consumers 
842 regard European products to offer greater quality and safety assurances than 
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843 domestically produced alternatives and demonstrate a desire for domestically 
844 produced products to reach the same level of production quality and safety (El 
845 Benni et al., 2018, Liu et al., 2014, Qiao et al., 2012). Within this research, 
846 European products, in particular well recognised European brands, were reported to 
847 be sought wherever possible with preference shown for brands that were ‘truly 
848 foreign’, abating concerns regarding tampering and adulteration during the 
849 production process. This supports the findings of Liu et al. (2015) who identified 
850 consumers made distinctions between the level of authenticity of branded products 
851 of those that are made in foreign markets versus those that produced in China. 
852 Authentic brands manufactured in their originating country were deemed to have a 
853 higher level of authenticity than those produced in an inauthentic country of 
854 manufacture. For example, German infant milk brand Aptimil produced in Germany 
855 was regarded to be more authentic than the identical product formulation produced 
856 by the same company in China. Although the methods adopted in this research do 
857 not permit quantification, consumers expressed willingness to pay for imported 
858 products that better met authenticity requirements.
859 The importance of interpersonal relationships in aiding the identification and 
860 acquisition of reliable products (including European products) were identified. The 
861 absence of trust in food chain actors resulted in the elevated importance of kinship 
862 networks, including social media channels in identifying authentic products, trusted 
863 retailers and sourcing products. The reliance on kinship networks has been shown to 
864 be a reaction to the lack of formal systems designed to protect consumers, or a 
865 response to disruptions the food chain, through for example, reported instances of 
866 fraud (Lyon and Porter, 2007). This may also reflect the collectivist nature of 
867 Chinese society, which places cultural value on kinship relations, with consumers 
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868 shown to rely more on interpersonal rather than formal communications (Yau, 
869 1988). The size of the Chinese market coupled with domestic distrust represents 
870 significant market potential for high quality European food exports, and industry 
871 actors must recognise the importance of informal channels as valued information 
872 sources by Chinese consumers. As a result, they should utilise these channels 
873 (particularly social media platforms) to disseminate information regarding the 
874 measures taken to deter fraud and better support consumer identification of 
875 authentic products.
876 Consumers showed a preference for large retailers including international 
877 supermarkets over small independent retailers or street vendors which were 
878 identified to be likely to be implicated in fraudulent practice (see also Xia and Zeng 
879 (2006). Large retailers were considered to offer wider product ranges, including 
880 reputable supplies of imported food product, and offering greater assurances of 
881 product authenticity. Consumers regarded these large retailers to be within the 
882 regulatory control of government and their international reputations a key fraud 
883 deterrent mechanism, as well as making them more responsive if products failed to 
884 meet expectations. European food importers must recognise the strength of large 
885 retailers as preferred distribution channels for imported products. That said, the 
886 importance of developing strong personal relationships with suppliers and brands 
887 was also recognised, with consumers valuing relationships with primary producers, 
888 reflected in the growing prominence of alternative food networks in China (see for 
889 example, Sausmikat (2015) and Zhang et al. (2016)). The presence of brand stores, 
890 particularly in the case of Scotch whisky and olive oil, in addition to presence in 
891 large retailers was identified by Chinese consumers as supporting the identification 
892 authentic and safe products. European exporters of olive oil and Scotch whisky, are 
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893 encouraged to consider independent distribution channels as an important 
894 mechanism for increasing brand presence, reputation and consumer trust and 
895 loyalty, as well as a crucial means of building product category knowledge. This 
896 will improve brand protection by supporting Chinese consumers to more 
897 confidently identify authentic products and whistle blow where products fail to meet 
898 brand standards. 
899 At the product level, constructed cues of authenticity were used as one element of 
900 the wider risk reliving strategies adopted by Chinese consumers to support the 
901 identification of authentic products. Consumers had greatest trust in cues that were 
902 difficult to replicate and as noted, country of origin was considered a key attribute 
903 relied upon to support authenticity and quality assessments. Whilst considerable 
904 research has been conducted exploring Chinese consumers’ willingness–to-pay for 
905 traceability and foods of certified quality (see (Xu et al., 2012, Tang et al., 2015, El 
906 Benni et al., 2018, Wu et al., 2011, Xu and Wu, 2010), this research highlighted 
907 consumer reliance on traditional indicators of product quality, such as price, which 
908 were used to make inferences regarding authenticity and safety. Certifications and 
909 cues of integrity were not often used despite these offering the most robust 
910 indication at the point of purchase of a products authenticity and safety and the 
911 ability to objectively verify these, Chinese consumers noted the sophistication of 
912 fraudsters and expressed concerns that these could also be falsified (see also Cheng 
913 (2011)). 
914
915 Chinese consumers are however, prepared to pay a premium for trustworthy 
916 authenticity cues, with authenticity and safety guarantees usually adding net value 
917 to products. In order to stay one step ahead of fraudsters, manufacturers are 
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918 encouraged to continually innovate and increase the sophistication and variety of 
919 integrity cues on products as a fraud deterrence measure. However, this research has 
920 indicated that in order for consumers to use and trust these measures, innovations 
921 must be designed taking into consideration consumer preferences and information 
922 needs. Moreover, preference for the type of authenticity cue(s) was shown to be 
923 product specific so market research should include this as a part of product testing. 
924 In line with this, food industry actors are encouraged to improve communication 
925 with consumers regarding the measures taken to guarantee the authenticity and 
926 safety of products. Although highlighting these measures may also help 
927 counterfeiters, regularly updating authenticity processes and effectively 
928 communication these to consumers was thought to help industry stay one step ahead 
929 of the fraudsters, and maintain consumer trust with their efforts, as well as support 
930 consumer judgements regarding authentic and safe food. 
931 Finally, differences in attitudes towards fraud, and the personal measures taken to 
932 reduce the likelihood of encountering inauthentic food, were shown to be dependent 
933 upon the intended consumer and consumption occasion. Chinese consumers were 
934 found to make evaluations regarding the level of risk associated with encountering 
935 inauthentic food products, with risk to health being the most feared consequence. 
936 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the industries recent safety history and the risk to 
937 public health from adulteration, consumers expressed a zero tolerance towards 
938 inauthentic products intended for infants (particularly infant formula milk). As 
939 guardians, it was considered the responsibility of parents to ensure the authenticity 
940 intended for consumption by infants. Extensive product search and acquisition 
941 strategies, including travel to neighbouring states with better safety records, and 
942 informal import networks to ensure its authenticity, were identified. In other 
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943 circumstances, in-authentic products were tolerated and even expected, as was 
944 illustrated in discussions relating to the consumption of Scotch whisky, where the 
945 perceived risk to health as a consequence of consuming an adulterated product was 
946 considered to be low. In this instance, where importance was placed on the 
947 consumption of the product for enjoyment and social engagement, the most 
948 important product attribute was price rather than safety per se. This finding supports 
949 Liu et al. (2015), which stipulates that Chinese consumer perceptions of authenticity 
950 are multifaceted, with tolerance shown for fraud under some circumstances but not 
951 in others. Acceptance was shown for mimicked products known in the Chinese 
952 market as ‘Shanzhai’ products (own branded products that copy originals but with 
953 reduced quality, which are more affordable than authentic products). Mimicked 
954 products are associated with perceptions of a low level of authenticity due to their 
955 openness in imitating the real product, whilst counterfeit or adulterated products are 
956 unacceptable to Chinese consumers. However, it must be noted that this research 
957 explored consumer attitudes towards goods and not food products. This response to 
958 authenticity can also be explained by considering the Chinese Confucian cultural 
959 value system. Within this belief system imitation of superiors is considered the 
960 highest form of flattery and deemed practically and morally acceptable. However, 
961 cheating, which is represented by the concealed nature of counterfeiting and fraud, 
962 is condemned (Yau, 1988, Liu et al., 2015). 
963
964 Limited consumer product category knowledge may offer an alternative explanation 
965 for why consumer tolerance of fraud can be situationally/product dependant. Seitz 
966 and Roosen (2015) present evidence to suggest Chinese consumers generally 
967 possess low levels of knowledge regarding European food products. This was found 
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968 to be the case for olive oil and Scotch whisky, which despite purchasing for 
969 perceived quality assurances, participants showed limited understanding of how the 
970 respective products were best consumed and/or how high quality products are 
971 identified, other than by relying on price as an indicator. In order to support 
972 consumer identification of authentic products, exporters of European foods to China 
973 are therefore advised to improve educational efforts surrounding product 
974 characteristics, appropriate product use and means of identifying authentic products, 
975 which would also further support product differentiation within the Chinese market. 
976 As noted, the presence of branded retail outlets would be one way in which this 
977 could be supported. 
978 5 CONCLUSIONS 
979 In China, historical regulatory inadequacies and persistent media reporting of food 
980 safety incidents including fraud, has resulted in limited consumer trust in the 
981 domestic food system. Despite significant regulatory reforms, fraudulent activity is 
982 considered pervasive, although the associated risks are not well understood by 
983 consumers. The common perception of food fraud is that it is a collective term 
984 encompassing threats to the authenticity, safety, quality and reliability of food and a 
985 primary barrier to the attainment of safe food. In response, consumers have 
986 developed a variety of pre and post purchase and consumption strategies to 
987 personally mitigate the risks associated with fraud. Low levels of trust in the 
988 domestic market, as well as growing demand from middle class Chinese consumers 
989 for authentic and safe food, represents significant market potential for high quality 
990 European food exports. Exporters of European products looking to capitalise on 
991 market opportunities in China are encouraged to recognise the breadth of strategies 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
43
992 adopted by Chinese consumers to ensure authentic and safe food, and consider the 
993 impact of these for consumer communication and product distribution channels. At 
994 the product level, this research highlights the importance integrity cues a key brand 
995 protection mechanism and means of improving consumer trust. However, it is 
996 essential that these align with consumer preferences and meet information 
997 requirements in order to improve consumer trust in more sophisticated fraud 
998 deterrence mechanisms. Finally, fraud perceptions were product and consumption 
999 situation dependant. Improving Chinese consumer product category knowledge 
1000 particularly for culturally unfamiliar products (i.e. olive oil and Scotch whiskey) 
1001 will support consumers to make product authenticity and safety evaluations across a 
1002 wider range of consumption situations and further increase brand reputation and 
1003 trust.
1004 5.1 Limitations
1005
1006 This research has a number of limitations. First, this research was conducted prior to 
1007 the 2015 Chinese Food Safety Law revisions, future research might therefore, 
1008 usefully explore the impact that these reforms may have had upon consumer trust, 
1009 in particular in relation to small and micro enterprises which dominate food 
1010 production. Second, the research was conducted with participation of middle-class 
1011 Chinese consumers as the intended consumers for European food and drink imports. 
1012 Therefore, this does not take into consideration the views of consumers of lower 
1013 socio-economic status, who may not possess the purchasing power to afford foods 
1014 that provide better authenticity guarantees (i.e. European foods) and therefore, may 
1015 be more vulnerable to experiencing fraud, may hold different attitudes towards food 
1016 fraud and have alternative coping mechanisms to reduce the risks of purchasing 
1017 unsafe food. Whilst this is not a limitation of the current research per se, it is 
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1018 important to highlight and future research might be encouraged to compare different 
1019 consumer groups from different socio-economic segments. Whilst the intention of 
1020 qualitative research is not to generalise the findings beyond the sample group, this 
1021 research was conducted in three urban locations and therefore does not represent the 
1022 views of consumers residing in other locations in China. Future research could 
1023 therefore consider eliciting views from a broader range of geographical locations 
1024 and explore the differences between consumers residing in urban and rural locales
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Figure 1: Barriers to the attainment of authentic and safe food.
Note: Figure 1 illustrates the links between perceived barriers to the attainment of authentic and safe food, 
given the perceptual nature of the research these are not causal links. 
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Figure 2: Risk relieving strategies 
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Highlights
 Chinese consumers perceive food fraud to represent a risk to the safety of food
 To mitigate the perceived risks associate with food fraud, consumers developed a range of 
risk-relieving strategies
 The level of perceived risk posed by food fraud was product and consumption situation 
dependant
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Table 1. Defining Food Fraud: Case examples from China 
Type of fraud Definition Example incidents in China and Chinese 
involvement in Europe.
Potential public health treat that 
could lead to illness or death
Counterfeiting All aspects of the fraudulent 
product and packaging are 
replicated. 
In January 2017, 50 factories in the 
Northern Port City of Tianjin were raided 
and found to be manufacturing counterfeit 
condiments and seasonings imitating brands 
such as Nestle and Knorr. The products 
were found contain contaminants, including 
industrial grade salt and artificial 
flavourings (China Food and Drink 
Administration, 2017). 
Fraudulent product with potential to 
include unknown contaminants and 
fraudulent components. 
Adulteration A process by which the quality of 
food is lowered either by the 
addition of inferior quality material 
or by extraction of valuable 
ingredient.
In 2008 melamine was added to infant 
formula milk to give the powder a higher 
apparent protein content. The incident 
affected the health of approximately 300, 
000 people (predominantly infants), resulted 
in the hospitalisation of 55,000 people and 
the death of 6 babies as a result of kidney 
failure (Veeck et al., 2010).
Unknown contaminant and fraudulent 
component.
Mislabelling Making incorrect claims about the 
food, such as the geographical 
origin, the production method, or 
the best-before date.
In 2011, 110 people were arrested for the 
illegal sale of pork from pigs that had died 
as a result of disease rather than slaughtered 
in accordance with regulations. 
Consequently 1,000 tonnes of pork meat 
were confiscated. 
Sale and use of illegally recycled cooking 
oil known as “Gutter oil”. Oil is recovered 
from the drains outside restaurants, filtered 
and re-sold as fresh cooking fat. In 2011, 32 
Fraudulent packaging information and 
inferior quality ingredients. 
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people were arrested and more than 100 
tonnes of oil were seized across 14 
provinces (BBC, 2011). .
In 2013, Chinese court sentences criminal to 
4 years imprisonment and £50,000 fine for 
mislabelling cheap Chinese spirit as ‘Scotch 
Whisky’ (BBC, 2013).
Diversion The sale or distribution of 
legitimate products outside of 
intended markets.
Relief foods directed to markets where aid 
is not required.
Shortages or delays in relief food to 
needy populations. 
Over-running A legitimate product is made in 
excess of production arrangements. 
Under-reporting of production. Fraudulent products are distributed 
outside of regulated or controlled 
supply chains. 
Simulation Illegitimate production is designed 
to look like but does not exactly 
copy the legitimate product, such 
as slightly changing the name.
“Knock-off” items produced without the 
same quality assurances. Bottles of ‘Glen 
Highland Green Blended Whisky’ seized 
from production in Fujian province in 
Southeast China. The bottles did not claim 
to be “Scotch Whisky” although the name 
insinuates Scottish origin (Bruce-Gardyne, 
2015). 
Fraudulent products are of inferior 
quality.
Tampering Legitimate product and packaging 
are used in a fraudulent way. 
Illegally made or unregulated alcoholic 
drinks are placed into genuine high-end 
bottles and passed off as high-end brands 
(Scotch Whisky Association, 2013). In 
2014, in Guangdong province, police 
uncovered a gang operation that was 
refilling branded bottles with locally 
produced liquor in unsanitary conditions. 
Branded bottles were reported to be 
Fraudulent packaging information and 
inferior product quality.
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scavenged from bars or illegally purchased 
from bar staff (Fullerton, 2015).  
Theft Legitimate product is stolen and 
passed off as being legitimately 
procured. 
Cargo theft introduced into commerce 
(Spink et al., 2015)
The fraudulent product is distributed 
outside of regulated or controlled 
supply chains.
Adapted from Spink and Moyer (2011)
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Table 2: European Food and Drink Product Focus
Product Brands Consumers Consumption 
Occasion
Implication in Food 
Fraud 
Fraud prevention 
measures
Insights 
Olive Oil - Mighty 
(produced in 
Spain, 
packaged in 
China)
- Betis 
(Produced in 
Spain, 
Packaged in 
Spain)
- Olive life 
(produced in 
China, 
packaged in 
China)
Middle-class 
and high 
income 
consumers
Individual Lower grade or 
adulterated oil passed 
off as extra virgin olive 
oil. “Gutter oil”, or 
illicit cooking oil that 
has been recycled from 
waste oil collected from 
restaurant fryers, drains, 
grease traps and 
slaughterhouse waste 
(Lu and Wu, 2014).
European Union’s 
system of approval 
guarantees product 
quality through 
certification.  
Protected Destination 
of Origin (PGO) and 
Protected 
Geographical 
Indication (PGI) has 
been granted for olive 
oils produced in Italy, 
Spain, France, Greece 
and Portugal. 
i. The analysis of 
issues relating to 
traceability, 
including an 
understanding of 
labels, packaging, 
certifications, 
country of origin, 
brand, retail outlet 
and price; 
ii. The importance of 
authenticity where 
‘health’ is an 
important attribute
Scotch 
Whisky
- Jonny Walker 
Red Label
- Chivas Regal
- Macallan
Middle-class 
and high 
income 
consumers
Individual/ 
Social
High value aspirational 
product has resulted in 
its implication in food 
fraud.
SpiritsEurope estimate 
that 30% of ‘Scotch 
Whisky’ sold in China 
is fake (Scotch Whisky 
Association, 2013). 
Scotch Whisky has 
protected geographical 
indication (GI) status 
in European law (EC 
Regulation 110/2008)’ 
which is also 
recognised in Chinese 
legislation and has 
provided the legal 
basis for the Scotch 
Whisky Association to 
work with Chinese 
i. The importance of 
country of origin 
and PGI status as 
an indicator of 
authenticity.
ii. Consumer 
concerns about the 
purchase and 
consumption of a 
high value product 
where 
counterfeiting has 
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authorities to 
prosecute fraudulent 
activities on behalf of 
its members (Scotch 
Whisky Association, 
2015). 
been 
demonstrated.
iii. The importance of 
consumption 
occasion in the 
purchase and 
decision making 
process.
Infant 
Formula 
Milk
- Beingmate 
(produced and 
packaged in 
China)
- Illumia 
(produced in 
Ireland 
packaged in 
China)
- Bimbosan 
(produced and 
packaged in 
Switzerland)
- Pro-Kiddo 
(produced and 
packaged in 
China)
Infants Individual Melamine Scandal 
China (2008) 6 infants 
died as a result of renal 
failure and 54,000 were 
hospitalised. Resulted in 
a global ban on powered 
milk products produced 
in China.
Formalisation of 
China’s food safety 
laws. China’s first 
food safety law 
became operational in 
2009 and was revised 
in 2015 to give greater 
powers of prosecution 
to those involved in 
surveillance and 
enforcement.
i. The importance of 
country of origin 
and traceability in 
purchase decisions 
ii. The authenticity 
and integrity of a 
product category 
used by a 
‘vulnerable’ target 
group.
(Source: adapted from Kendall et al. (2018)
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Table 2: Focus group sample characteristics
Focus 
Group 
location 
and theme
Focus 
Group 
number
Participant 
no.
Participant 
code
Age Gender Monthly 
Income 
(RMB ¥)
Weekly 
food 
spend 
(RMB ¥)
Total n=7 n=42 - 22-48 n=22 male
n=20 
female
10000-
40000
1401-3500
Beijing: 
Scotch 
whisky and 
olive oil
1 n=6 Beijing G1 
male
Beijing G1 
female
22-42 n=4 male
n=2 
female
15000-
40000
1400-3000
Beijing,  
Scotch 
whisky and 
olive oil
2 n=6 Beijing G2 
male
Beijing G2 
female
24-48 n=2 male
n=4 
female
15000-
30000
1400-3000
Beijing, 
IMF and 
olive oil
3 n=6 Beijing G3 
male
Beijing G3 
female
35-42 n=4 male 
n=2 
female
15000-
40000
1400-3500
Chengdu, 
Scotch 
whisky and 
olive oil
4 n=6 Chengdu G4 
male 
Chengdu G4 
female 
24-37 n=2 male 
n=4 
female
10000-
16000
1200-1800
Chengdu, 
IMF and 
olive oil
5 n=6 Chengdu G5 
male 
Chengdu G5 
female
25-36 n=4 male
n= 2 
female
11000-
20000
1200-2500
Guangzhou, 
IMF  and 
olive oil
6 n=6 Guangzhou 
G6 male
Guangzhou 
G6 female 
29-36 n=4 
female
n= 2 male
16000 1400-2000
Guangzhou,  
Scotch 
whisky and 
olive oil
7 n=6 Guangzhou 
G7 male
Guangzhou 
G7 female
29-36 n=4 male
n= 2 
female
16000-
18000
1400-2000
